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Abstract
Consider a buyer and a seller who have agreed to trade an intermediate good. It
is ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the prevailing state of the world. The
seller has private information about the costs of adapting the good. In the case of
non-integration, the buyer has no possibility to verify claims that the seller makes
about her costs. In the case of vertical integration, the buyer can verify evidence
about the costs that the seller might be able to provide. Even though we assume no
further differences between the ownership structures, it turns out that the parties
may prefer non-integration.
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1 Introduction
Consider a producer of a final good who needs an intermediate product. Should the
producer make the intermediate good in-house, or should he buy it from another
firm? What are the costs and benefits of outsourcing; i.e., what are the optimal
boundaries of the firm?
The “make-or-buy” decision has been discussed by economists since the path-
breaking work by Coase (1937). Further progress was made in the literature on
transaction cost economics (TCE), see in particular Williamson (1975, 1985). Ac-
cording to the view expressed in this literature, vertical integration can reduce ex-
post transaction costs. In the present paper, we consider asymmetric information
as a source of transaction costs. Indeed, we find that under some circumstances
vertical integration can mitigate the ex-post inefficiencies caused by asymmetric in-
formation. Yet, there are also circumstances under which ex-post inefficiencies that
would arise under vertical integration can be avoided under non-integration. We
thus present a formal model in which the costs and benefits of vertical integration
stem from the same force.
Our contribution builds on the formal property rights theory (PRT) pioneered
by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995).1 The
central assumption in the PRT literature is that contracts are incomplete, so parties
bargain ex-post over decisions that are not ex-ante contractible. The outcome of
the negotiations depends on the prevailing ownership structure, where ownership
confers control rights. Most contributions to the PRT literature assume that the
parties are symmetrically informed, such that bargaining leads to an ex-post efficient
outcome. Ownership matters, because the ex-post division of the surplus determines
the incentives to make ex-ante investments. Hence, the optimal ownership structure
is the one that best mitigates the hold-up problem.2 However, Hart (1995, p. 87)
has already pointed out that ex-ante investments are not a crucial ingredient of
1See Hart (2011) for a concise literature survey on the theory of the firm. See also Segal and
Whinston (2013) for a comprehensive review of the literature on property rights.
2In contrast, Williamson (2000, 2002), Gibbons (2005), and Tadelis and Williamson (2013) have
emphasized the central role of ex-post inefficiencies in TCE.
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PRT models, and he has mentioned asymmetric information at the ex-post stage
as a potential source of inefficiency which could be influenced by the allocation of
control rights.
In the present paper, we study the choice between vertical integration and out-
sourcing in an incomplete contracts model without ex-ante investments. Specifically,
we consider a buyer who negotiates with a seller about the delivery of an interme-
diate good. Initially, only the characteristics of a basic version of the good are
contractible. Once the state of the world has been realized, the seller can incur
costs to adapt the good to the prevailing state. However, the seller has private
information about the costs, so the ex-post negotiations might fail and only the
basic version of the intermediate product might be traded, which would be ex-post
inefficient. Following the PRT literature, we assume that the ownership structure
determines who has the relevant control rights.
In the case of non-integration (i.e., outsourcing), the seller has the control rights
regarding the production of the intermediate good. When the seller is in control, she
can e.g. manipulate transfer prices or choose among different depreciation methods,
so profits can be shifted between divisions of the seller’s firm or between different
periods. The buyer has no possibility to verify claims that the seller makes about
her costs, because the buyer cannot cleanly disentangle the costs associated with the
intermediate good from other business activities of the seller. Since in the case of
non-integration the seller is free to manufacture evidence about her costs, the buyer
would simply disregard any evidence provided by the seller.
In contrast, under vertical integration the buyer has the relevant control rights.
In this case, the buyer can make sure that the seller has not manipulated any
evidence that she might be able to provide with regard to her costs. Thus, if the
seller can provide evidence to the buyer, the buyer is able to verify that the evidence
is true.3
Following the contract-theoretic literature on “hard” information started by Ti-
role (1986), we assume that evidence is obtained by the seller with a probability
3The fact that informational asymmetries may sometimes be removed within a firm was em-
phasized as a defining characteristic of integration by Arrow (1975) and Riordan (1990).
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strictly smaller than one only.4 Thus, the seller can always claim that she has no
evidence.5 Of course, if the seller obtained evidence with probability one, then ver-
tical integration would clearly be optimal, because it would always allow to remove
the informational asymmetries. At first sight, one might guess that vertical inte-
gration remains to be superior when the seller obtains evidence only stochastically,
because vertical integration at least sometimes allows to remove the informational
asymmetry, and there are no further differences between the ownership structures.
Yet, in what follows we will show that under some circumstances the expected total
surplus can actually be strictly larger in the case of non-integration.
Related literature. While most papers in the PRT literature assume symmetric
information, some authors have also studied the role of asymmetric information, see
e.g. Schmitz (2006, 2008a, 2017), Goldlücke and Schmitz (2014), and Su (2017a).6
Yet, these papers do not allow for “hard” information (i.e., evidence that may be
verified). Mohan (2014) studies investment incentives in an incomplete contracting
model in which “hard” information may be revealed. However, in his model ex-post
bargaining takes place under symmetric information. Mori (2020) studies a model
4See e.g. Martimort (1999, p. 933), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999, p. 17), and Laffont (1999,
p. 654) for similar assumptions.
5As an illustration for our setting along the lines of Aghion and Tirole (1994), let the buyer
(customer) be a pharmaceutical company (say, producing and distributing vaccines) and let the
seller be a small biotech research unit (potentially adapting a vaccine to a mutated virus). When
the research unit is an independent entity, it has discretion regarding its research strategy, so it
could present to the customer ideas that would require large amounts of funding, even though it
already knows that there might be more cost-efficient alternatives that it will ultimately choose.
When the customer is in control, he decides about the research strategy, so the research unit has no
room for diverting money, and early indicators that it might have about the costs of the strategy
chosen by the customer will actually be relevant. Yet, due to the innovative nature of the task,
there is still a positive probability that the research unit cannot yet present much evidence about
the expected costs at the point in time when the pharmaceutical company has to decide whether
or not to go forward with the project.
6On the role of asymmetric information in hold-up problems, cf. also Schmitz (2008b) and
Goltsman (2011). Moreover, see also Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) on know-how transfer in an
incomplete contracting framework.
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to formalize a trade-off between ex-ante investments and ex-post adaptations. In
contrast, ex-ante investments play no role in the present setup.7 Finally, ex-ante
investments also play no role in the more recent contributions to the PRT literature
by Hart and Moore (2007, 2008).8 Yet, these papers assume symmetric informa-
tion and rely on behavioral assumptions, while in the present paper asymmetric
information plays a central role and all parties are standard profit-maximizers.
2 The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, a buyer (B) and a seller (S), who can trade an
intermediate product. At some initial date 1, the parties agree to trade a basic
version of the good. Let the buyer’s valuation of the basic good be given by v0,
and let the seller’s costs of producing the basic good be c0, where v0 > c0 > 0.
Moreover, at date 1 the parties choose an ownership structure o ∈ {V I,NI}, where
o = V I means vertical integration and o = NI means non-integration. At this
point in time, the parties are still symmetrically informed, so they agree on the
ownership structure that maximizes the expected total surplus. The parties can
specify a transfer payment t0 from the buyer to the seller in order to divide the
expected total surplus according to their ex-ante bargaining powers.9
At date 2, the state of the world is realized and modifications of the basic good
become contractible. Specifically, when the seller adapts the good to the prevailing
state of the world, then the buyer’s valuation is increased from v0 to v0 + v. The
seller’s additional costs caused by adapting the good are c ∈ {cL, cH}, where 0 <
7See also Mori (2017) for a model of ex-post haggling focused on third-party arbitration.
8Hart (1995, p. 88) already mentioned as a possible source of inefficiency that the parties might
simply “not get along” at the ex-post stage, an idea that was formalized by Hart and Moore (2007,
2008). The central assumption is that contracts serve as reference points and parties are aggrieved
if they do not get what they feel entitled to, which may lead them to engage in ex-post inefficient
“shading” activities.
9In line with most contributions to the PRT literature, it is not necessary to specify the parties’
ex-ante bargaining powers (and thus the payment t0), because it is irrelevant for the optimal
ownership structure how the parties divide the ex-ante expected total surplus.
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cL < cH < v. Thus, it is always ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the state of
the world. From an ex-ante point of view, the probability that the costs are low
(c = cL) is given by p ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the expected costs of adapting the good are
E[c] = pcL + (1 − p)cH . The parties negotiate at date 2 about whether or not the
seller adapts the good in exchange for an additional payment t. With probability π,
the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, while otherwise the seller
can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer.10 When the parties do not reach
an agreement, only the basic version of the good is traded and the buyer pays t0 to
the seller. When the parties reach an agreement, then the adapted good is traded
and the buyer pays t0 + t to the seller.
Suppose that regardless of the ownership structure o, the seller always privately
learns the realization of c at date 2.11 In addition, with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) the
seller obtains evidence whether c = cL or c = cH has been realized. In the case
of non-integration (o = NI), the buyer cannot verify any evidence provided by the
seller; i.e., the realization of c can never be proved to the buyer. Yet, in the case of
vertical integration (o = V I), the buyer is able to verify evidence provided by the
seller. Hence, if o = V I, then with probability λ the seller can prove to the buyer
whether c = cL or c = cH has been realized.
Observe that if the probability λ were equal to zero, there would be no difference
between the two ownership structures. Moreover, if the probability λ were equal
to 1, it is obvious that vertical integration would be optimal, since in this case the
realization of c would always be verifiable and hence the parties would always agree
on adapting the good.
10This simple non-cooperative bargaining game has often been used in the related literature, see
e.g. Hart and Moore (1999, p. 135) and Schmitz (2006).
11Note that the information structure is exogenously given. See Schmitz (2006) for a property
rights model with costly information acquisition, albeit in a context with only “soft” information.
On information gathering, cf. also Hoppe and Schmitz (2010, 2013), Iossa and Martimort (2015),
Su (2017b), Ye and Li (2018), and the literature discussed there.
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3 Non-integration
Let us start the analysis by considering non-integration (o = NI). First, suppose
that at date 2 the buyer can make the offer.12 Note that the buyer will offer to pay
either t = cL or t = cH for the adaptation.
13 It is optimal for the buyer to offer
t = cH whenever
v0 − t0 + v − cH ≥ v0 − t0 + p(v − cL),
because the offer t = cH will always be accepted by the seller, while the offer t = cL






while he offers to pay t = cL otherwise.
Next, suppose that at date 2 the seller can make the offer. The seller will then
ask the buyer to pay t = v, which the buyer is just willing to accept.14























t0 − c0 + (1− π)(v − E[c]) otherwise,
12Throughout, we make the standard assumption that a party that is indifferent between ac-
cepting and rejecting an offer will accept the offer.
13To see this, observe that an offer strictly smaller than cL would always be rejected. Offers
weakly larger than cH would always be accepted, so cH is optimal for the buyer among these offers.
Moreover, offers weakly larger than cL and strictly smaller than cH would be accepted if and only
if c = cL, so the offer cL is optimal for the buyer among these offers.
14It should be noted that our focus on posted-price contracts is without loss of generality. If the
seller can make the offer, she extracts the full surplus, so she cannot do better. By invoking the
revelation principle (cf. Myerson, 1982), it is straightforward to show that also if the buyer can
make the offer, he cannot do better. Specifically, the optimal direct revelation mechanism would
yield the same outcome as the optimal posted-price contract; see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
chapter 7) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983).
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v0 − c0 + πp(v − cL) + (1− π)(v − E[c]) otherwise.
Observe that if condition (1) is satisfied, the first-best solution is attained, because
the parties always trade the adapted good. Yet, if condition (1) does not hold, there
is an ex-post inefficiency with probability π(1− p). Specifically, when at date 2 the
buyer can make the offer, the seller’s costs are high, and condition (1) does not hold,
then the parties trade the basic good only, which is ex-post inefficient.
4 Vertical integration
Now let us analyze the case of vertical integration (o = V I). First, suppose that at
date 2 the buyer can make the offer. Note that the buyer will still offer to pay either
t = cL or t = cH for the adaptation. Yet, the buyer can make his offer dependent on
whether or not the seller provides evidence regarding her costs. Therefore, the best
the buyer can do at date 2 in order to maximize his expected payoff is to choose
between the following two alternatives. Alternative (a) is to offer to pay t = cH for
the adaptation. Alternative (b) is to offer to pay t = cL, unless the seller proves
that c = cH has been realized, in which case the buyer offers to pay t = cH . The
buyer prefers alternative (a) whenever
v0 − t0 + v − cH ≥ v0 − t0 + λ(v − E[c]) + (1− λ)p(v − cL).
The left-hand side shows the buyer’s payoff under alternative (a). When the buyer
offers to pay t = cH , the seller always agrees to trade the adapted good. The
right-hand side shows the buyer’s expected payoff under alternative (b). Note that
with probability λ the seller can prove the realization of her costs. In this case, the
seller is just reimbursed for her costs and the adapted good is always traded. With
probability 1 − λ, the seller cannot prove the realization of her costs. In this case,
the seller agrees to trade the adapted good if and only if c = cL has been realized.
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Observe that the buyer prefers alternative (a) whenever
p ≤
(1− λ)(v − cH)
v − cL − λ(v − cH)
(2)
holds.
Next, suppose that at date 2 the seller can make the offer. The seller will then
ask the buyer to pay t = v, which the buyer is just willing to accept.15























t0 − c0 + (1− π)(v − E[c]) otherwise,










v0 − c0 + π(1− λ)p(v − cL) + (1− π + πλ)(v − E[c]) otherwise.
Notice that the first-best outcome is achieved if condition (2) is satisfied, because
then the parties always trade the adapted good. Yet, if condition (2) does not hold,
there is an ex-post inefficiency with probability π(1−λ)(1− p). In particular, when
at date 2 the buyer can make the offer, the seller’s costs are high but the seller has
no evidence to prove it, and condition (2) does not hold, then the parties trade the
basic good only.
15Our focus on posted-price contracts is again without loss of generality. While this is obvious
if the seller can make the offer, it is also true if the buyer can make the offer. In the latter case, it
follows from Green and Laffont (1986) that the revelation principle is valid and it is straightforward
to adapt the optimal direct revelation mechanisms for the case of “hard” information derived in
Schmitz (2007, 2021) to the present setup in order to show that the same outcome is attained as
by the optimal posted-price contract.
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5 Optimal ownership
Recall that at date 1 the parties agree on the ownership structure that maximizes
the expected total surplus. Note that
0 <
(1− λ)(v − cH)





must hold for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, a comparison of SV I and SNI leads to the
following conclusion, which is illustrated in Figure 1.16
Proposition 1 (i) If p > v−cH
v−cL
, then vertical integration is optimal (SV I > SNI).
(ii) If (1−λ)(v−cH)
v−cL−λ(v−cH)
< p ≤ v−cH
v−cL
, then non-integration is optimal (SV I < SNI).
(iii) If p ≤ (1−λ)(v−cH)
v−cL−λ(v−cH)
, then ownership does not matter (SV I = SNI).
In case (i) of the proposition, neither condition (1) nor condition (2) holds. In this
case, non-integration leads to an ex-post inefficiency with probability π(1−p), while
vertical integration leads to an ex-post inefficiency with probability π(1− λ)(1− p)
only. The fact that under vertical integration the buyer can verify evidence that the
seller might be able to provide with regard to the realization of her costs thus makes
vertical integration more attractive, as one might have expected.
In case (iii), the conditions (1) and (2) both hold, so the first-best outcome is
attained regardless of the ownership structure.
The remaining case (ii) is the most interesting one. In this case, condition (1)
is satisfied, while condition (2) does not hold. Hence, vertical integration leads to
an ex-post inefficiency with probability π(1−λ)(1− p), while non-integration yields
the first-best outcome. Thus, the potential presence of verifiable evidence in the
case of vertical integration can actually be harmful. To see this, observe that when
the buyer can make the offer at date 2, in the case of non-integration making the
offer t = cH (which will always be accepted) is more attractive than the alternative
(i.e., an offer t = cL, which would be accepted with probability p only). In contrast,
16Note that the figure depicts under what ownership structure the expected total surplus is
maximized, but it does not show by what amount the surplus levels differ between o = V I and
o = NI. Specifically, recall that the difference between the ownership structures disappears when
λ goes to zero, while the first-best outcome is always attained under o = V I when λ goes to one.
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in the case of vertical integration the offer t = cH is less attractive for the buyer
than the alternative (offering t = cL unless the seller proves that c = cH has been
realized, which will be accepted with probability λ+(1−λ)p > p). Thus, under non-
integration the buyer makes an offer that always covers the seller’s costs, even when
the costs are high, so ex-post efficiency is attained. Under vertical integration, the
buyer is willing to make such a large offer only if the seller proves that the costs are
high. As a consequence, there is an ex-post inefficiency with a positive probability,




















Figure 1. The optimal ownership structures. The curve between the blue
region and the brown region depicts the combinations of p and λ for which
condition (2) holds with equality.
6 Conclusion
In our model, in the case of vertical integration the buyer can verify evidence that
the seller might be able to provide with regard to her costs. In the case of non-
integration, the buyer cannot verify evidence presented by the seller. There are no
11
further differences between the two ownership structures. We have shown that it de-
pends on the parameter constellation whether vertical integration or non-integration
is optimal. Hence, in our model there is a single force working in two ways. The pros
and cons of outsourcing are two sides of the same coin, since they both follow from
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